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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STA TL OF UTAH, in the interest
of

CASE NO.
12713

MITCHELL HURLEY (4-10-54)
A person under I 8 yea rs of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency by
the Juvenile Court, Second District.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found in violation of Section 76-28-54,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that he, on or about the 18th
day of July, 1970, knowingly resisted, delayed and obstructed a public officer in the performance of his duty.
The lower court then ordered the appellant to pay a fine
ot $75.00.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the juvenile court
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Mitchell Hurley, a juvenile and a companion, Michael Valdez were in the area between 1300 East and
University Street and between 1st and 2nd South. Salt Lake
City. Utah. on the evening of July 20. 11970. This area i\
less than one block from the University Campus prope1
They were in an alleyway at the time. Officer Shilaos.
upon entering the alleyway, observed the two boys close to
a Volkswagen automobile. Mr. Hurley was holding the lid
up which covers the engine compartment. Upon seeing
Officer Shilaos. Mr. Hurley began to walk away rapidly.
(Tr. 2 ).
This was the immediate area in which the incident took
place. Upon stopping the two boys. Officer Shilaos began
to question them as to what they were doing. During this
investigation, a fight was started by Mr. Valdez in which lw
struck Officer Shilaos in the head. (Tr. 3 ).
While Officer Shilaos attempted to handcuff Mr. Valdez.
Mr. Hurley attempted to help Mr. Valdez, by either pushing
Officer Shilaos or releasing his grip on Mr. Valdez. (Tr. 5)
This action by the appellant resulted in the charge under
which the appellant was finally found guilty and fined
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
!HE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT OFFICER SHILAOS WAS A DULY CONSTITUTED POLICE OFFICER AND WAS PERFORMING
AN OFFICIAL DUTY AS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS
76-28-54 AND 53-45-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
l 95 3.
The statute which appellant states had not been complied
with is Section 53-45-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 which
states:
"Powers of members of police or security departments.-- Members of the police or security department of any state institution of higher education
shall be appointed by the governing board of such
institution and when so appointed shall be peace
officers and shall also have all of the powers possessed by policemen in cities and by sheriffs, including,
but not limited to, the power to make arrests on
view or on warrant of violation of state statutes and
city or county ordinances; providing, however, that
such powers may be exercised only in cities and
counties in which such institution, its branches or
properties are located and only in connection with
acts occurring on the property of such institution or
when required for the protection of its interests,
property, students or employees; and otherwise such
counties when specifically requested by the state or
local law enforcement officials having jurisdiction
. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
The appellant contends that Officer Shilaos was outside
of his jurisdiction and therefore was not a duly constituted
officer and thus could not be performing in an official capacity. It is the contention of the state that Officer Shilaos
was acting within the jurisdictional limitations of this
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statute in that he was in an area which had University
"interests" involved and he was protecting University
students and property.
Testimony given by Officer Shilaos at the juvenile hearing
shows that he was well aware of the fact that there wer,•
activities which were directly connected to the University
occurring in the area in which the incident took place.

Q.

What is in that immediate area? What are the
buildings in that area?

A.

There is a church, institute I should say, the
Newman Center, and I believe there are one or
two fraternities or sororities, I'm not sure
which. The rest of it is made up of apartment
buildings. (Tr. 17).

The Newman Center is designed to furnish religious
teachings to the University studentbody and faculty. The
Fraternities are a place of residence of a large number of
students, and a place for social activities while the students
are attending school.
It should further be concluded that if one of the jobs of
the Campus Security Police is to protect the student while
he is attending classwork, an integral part of that protection
must include the protection of the students' property.
Testimony offered by Officer Shilaos states that he was
aware that students property was often found in the alleyway where the incident took place.

Q.

How do you determine where you go at any
given time?

A.

Most of the officers and myself, we patrol the
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University of Utah and anything within its interests.
Q.

Are you saying within its interests? Had you
had anywhere you were looking for any specific thing?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Had you had any indication or anyone advise
you that there were any students in any difficulty off-campus that you should be over in
that area to look for?

A.

No, sir. Other than they park their cars back
there - students do.

It would be somewhat discomforting to think that a police officer would be required to wait until there was something specifically happening before he could go to the scene.
If this practice were followed, all policemen would remain
at the office until something happened. This is not the purpose of patrolling; it is to stop trouble before it can really
get started. A University officer must be able to go where
he knows problems may arise which have a direct bearing
on the University, its interests, property, students or employees, and which are in close proximity to the campus
proper. This is exactly what Officer Shilaos was doing when
he went into the alleyway. He was bringing all of his experience of being a University police officer and prior to
that being a student at the University of Utah, into play in
an attempt to protect the interests and students of the
University of Utah.

The appellant attempts to validate his argument that this
action was outside the jurisdiction of the University Police

by taking it to its absurd conclusion. By stating that 11
this action is concluded to be within the University\
"intl'rests" etc., that it will result in the Security Force !or
the University running all over the state in an attempt to
secure harmony and tranquility for the University's interests. The court need not follow this logie, since all th<it it
must decide are the facts of this individual case. Almost
any set of circumstances can be taken to a logical but absurd conclusion.
The property involved 1n the case was not located m
some remote location far from the University of Utah campus. but was less than one/half city block from the property
boundaries of the campus. (Tr. I 7 ). The area involved wa-,
not just any row of apartment build111gs housing a varil'ty of
persons, but included fraternity and sorority houses which
contJin studenb and which are subject to wide vJriety ot
regulJtions placed upon them by the University. The areJ
also included a religious center which services primarily
University students.
Furthermore, Officer Shilaos testified that this area was a
regularly patrolled areJ. (Tr. 16).

Q.

Is it your custom to patrol in that area·1

A.

Yes, sir.

In fact. the appellant admits within the confines of his
own argument that there will be times when the seL·urit)
police will bL' required to kave the campus proper in an attL'111pt to protect the students. and/or "inti:rests" of the

Univcr'->ity On page 9 of appellant\ bril'f, it states "Rather.
11111\f intne'->h would be protected in the ordinary course of
l;1w L'nforcement provided by the city and county police
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who have been given jurisdiction over these areas." (Emphasis added.) This incident is in fact one of those which
would not be covered by the appellant's "MOST" theory
stated above.
We should not expect a duly appointed peace officer to
shed his cloak of office when he fortuitiously happens upon
a suspicious set of events in an area that is in close proximity to the campus property and in which he knows includes
not only living facilities for students but also is the location
for social activities of the students and religious training of
students, faculty, and employees.
It should therefore be concluded that Officer Shilaos was

well within his jurisdictional limitations, since he was protecting the students of the University through his regular
patrolling procedure.
Respondent will need to give short shrift to appellants
contention that even if Officer Shilaos was within his jurisdiction and thus a duly constituted peace officer, he was
not engaged in the performance of an official duty of his
office.
Since it should be concluded that Officer Shilaos was
within the jurisdictional limitations of Section 53-45-5,
Utah Code Annotated, when he arrested the appellant, it
must follow that he was discharging his duty in an official
capacity. As an officially designated peace officer, Officer
Shilaos had the duty to uphold all the laws of the State of
Utah within his jurisdiction. At the time the appellant resisted and obstructed Officer Shilaos, the officer was performing one of his routine jobs as a peace officer. Therefore, the requirements of State v. Sandman, 4 U. 2d 69,
28fl P. 2d 1060 (19 5 5) have been com plied with. Officer
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Shilaos was a duly constituted public officer and was acting
to perform an official duty at the time of the incident of
July 18, 1970 at which time the appellant was charged with
obstructing an officer in the performance of his duty.
CONCLUSION
The appeliant was correctly charged and found guilty of
a violation of Section 76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated, by
the Juvenile Judge for the Second District for the State of
Utah. The facts clearly point out that Officer Shilaos was
doing regular police work in an area close to the University
in which Officer Shilaos knew that there was a great amount
of student activity and in which the University was responsible for regulating in certain areas. Thus, the requirement5
of Section 53-45-5, Utah Code Annotated have also been
followed. The appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DA YID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

